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24.1 Introduction
The definition of the appropriate equalitarian ob-
jective for the (re)distribution of many social and 
economic outcomes has been a long debated top-
ic among scholars, which is also of central interest 
for policy-makers. The notion of equality of oppor-
tunity has gained popularity over the last decades 
as one of the relevant distributional criteria for 
achieving a fair allocation of resources (see Lefranc 
et al., 2009 or Roemer and Trannoy, 2014) (192). Op-
portunities are equally distributed when individu-
als of the same ‘type’ (i.e., sharing similar circum-
stances of origin for which they cannot be held 
responsible), who make similar ‘effort’ choices (for 
example in terms of hours worked, educational 
choices, etc.), also face identical opportunity pro-
files. This does not imply that opportunities should 
coincide for everybody, but rather that factors such 
as the background of origin should have no direct 
impact on determining individual life chances. 
(191) Both authors are with LISER (Luxembourg). Comments by 
Anthony B. Atkinson, Luna Bellani, Tim Goedemé, Sigita 
Grundiza, Anne-Catherine Guio, Eric Marlier, Marco Pomati, 
Philippe Van Kerm and participants to the 2014 International 
Conference on Comparative EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions on a previous version are gratefully acknowledged. 
All remaining errors are ours. This work has been supported 
by the second Network for the analysis of EU-SILC (Net-SILC2), 
funded by Eurostat. The European Commission bears no 
responsibility for the analyses and conclusions, which are solely 
those of the authors. In addition, both authors acknowledge 
the financial support of the Luxembourg Ministry of Higher 
education and Andreoli acknowledges financial support from 
the Luxembourg Fonds National de la Recherche through AFR 
postdoctoral grant No 5932132. Email addresses: francesco.
andreoli@liser.lu and alessio.fusco@liser.lu.
(192) This setting follows the work of political philosophers such as 
Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989) and comprises 
traditional models of equality of opportunity such as Roemer 
(1998) and Fleurbaey (2008).
This is, indeed, the ideal distribution of opportu-
nities that the policymaker should target to reach 
an ‘endowment insensitive’, ‘responsibility-sensi-
tive’ allocation of resources (see Fleurbaey, 2008). 
When, instead, individual circumstances play a role 
in determining opportunities, a form of inequality 
of opportunity prevails, meaning that some types 
enjoy/suffer an unfair advantage/disadvantage 
compared to others.
By seeking to promote social inclusion across the 
EU, one of the objectives of the Europe 2020 policy 
agenda (see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book) is to en-
hance equality of opportunity among its citizens. 
Indeed, as argued by Atkinson and Marlier (2010, p. 
3), ‘an inclusive society is one that rises above differ-
ences of race, gender, class, generation and geog-
raphy to ensure equality of opportunity regardless 
of origin’. Yet, the extent to which this objective 
has been attained across the EU is disputable, and 
different chapters in this book are offering various 
perspectives on social inclusion issues in the EU.
This chapter proposes a coherent evaluation 
framework for assessing the inequality of opportu-
nity dimension of social exclusion in Europe. The 
contribution is twofold. First, it suggests a nov-
el way of quantifying the degree of inequality of 
opportunity through simple indicators, that are 
consistent with the normative perspectives on 
equality of opportunity (see Andreoli et al., 2014) 
and that have an appealing interpretation for the 
policymaker. Secondly, it illustrates the proposed 
measurement framework by investigating the evo-
lution of inequality of opportunity across selected 
European countries between 2005 and 2011.
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Many factors may have affected the evolution of 
opportunity profiles in the period we consider. The 
recent economic crisis, the so-called ‘Great Reces-
sion’, may have considerably reshaped individuals’ 
labour market opportunities, as a consequence of 
the interaction between the dynamics of the EU la-
bour market and the public intervention schemes 
promoted by each single government. While dis-
entangling the various mechanisms that affected 
the evolution of inequality of opportunity may be 
a difficult exercise involving a counterfactual anal-
ysis of opportunities distributions, understanding 
how the opportunities of different types evolved 
over the last decade is relevant to understand new 
forms of unfair disadvantage, and to provide a new 
perspective on the recent crisis effects. The em-
pirical goal of this chapter is to illustrate how the 
measures of inequality in access to opportunities 
discussed hereafter can usefully complement the 
current set of official statistics available to the pol-
icymaker. In particular, the chapter contrasts such 
measures with indicators of social inequalities, such 
as the EU ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or–social-exclusion’ in-
dicator (AROPE; see Chapters 1 and 3 in this book). 
Furthermore, it allows for an assessment of the 
extent of convergence of opportunity inequalities 
across EU countries.
One of the major empirical obstacles to the as-
sessment of inequality of opportunity is the lack 
of any large scale dataset of individual outcomes 
and circumstances, from where opportunity pro-
files can be estimated, which would allow for com-
parisons between countries and over time. In this 
chapter, we make use of the 2005 and 2011 EU-SILC 
ad hoc modules on intergenerational transmission 
of disadvantage where measures of parental back-
ground for a sufficiently large number of respond-
ents are available. We use annual labour earnings 
before state intervention as a measure of oppor-
tunity faced by working individuals. Indeed, gross 
earnings define living standards opportunities and 
consumption possibilities. We use paternal educa-
tion (a characteristic beyond one’s control) to cap-
ture the quality of the circumstances individuals 
are exposed to in young age (193). Our model focus-
(193) It is well known from father-son education and income 
intergeneration mobility studies that more educated parents 
transmit significant wealth and social advantages to their 
children (see Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014).
es on distributional assessments, meaning that the 
analysis is carried out by looking at the distribution 
of opportunities for people sharing the same fam-
ily background but making different effort choices.
The availability of the 2005 EU-SILC module led to 
several academic contributions analysing the ques-
tion of inequality of opportunity across Europe, 
such as Checchi et al. (2010), Dunnzlaff et al. (2010) 
or Marrero and Rodriguez (2012). These studies 
have in common the use of the same underlying 
data but differ in their implementation of the con-
cept of inequality of opportunity (194). To our knowl-
edge, this chapter is the first attempt to analyse the 
evolution of inequality of opportunity over time by 
making use of the 2011 EU-SILC module (195) as well.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 24.2 
presents in more details the indices of inequali-
ty of opportunity that we propose. Section 24.3 
contains the description of our empirical analysis 
based on EU-SILC data and Section 24.4, the results. 
Finally, Section 24.5 concludes.
24.2 Indices of inequality of 
opportunity
We assume that individual opportunities can be 
measured by virtue of an outcome of interest, de-
noted y, which is determined by three components:
• Circumstances (denoted c) capture illegitimate 
determinants of y that fall beyond individuals’ 
responsibility, such as parental background 
(194) Various synthetic indicators of the extent of inequality in 
opportunities distribution have been used/proposed in these 
papers. Dunnzlaff et al. (2010) apply Gini opportunity index to 
the outcome variable à la Lefranc et al. (2008) to measure the 
average degree of advantage across pairs of opportunity profiles, 
evaluated according to a specific evaluation function. Marrero 
and Rodriguez (2012) or Checchi et al. (2010) decompose overall 
income inequality using regression methods à la Ferreira and 
Gignoux (2011) and separate the part of income that is mostly 
associated with circumstances from the residual component.
(195) Other papers have used the 2011 module in the context of 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage analysis — 
a concept which bears similarity with that of EOp — e.g. 
Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana (2013), Serafino and Tonkin (2014) 
as well as Chapter 25 in this book. The methodology in this last 
chapter, in particular, is based on matching methods to assess, 
in a form of counterfactual analysis setting, the inheritance of 
financial poverty. This differs substantially from the normative 
evaluations expressed by the EOp framework presented here.
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or social origin. Individuals sharing the same 
circumstances belong to the same type.
• Effort (denoted e) captures legitimate 
determinants of y, that pertain to the sphere 
of individual responsibility.
• Attainable outcomes are contingent on a state 
variable (denoted s). All individuals in a society, 
which might represent a given country in 
a given period, share the same institutional 
background. The analysis of inequality of 
opportunity across states involves comparisons 
across countries and time.
Let ys(c,e) denote the outcome of an individual in 
state s with circumstances c and exerting effort e. 
Given effort, Equality of Opportunity (EOp) holds 
whenever circumstances do not contribute to ex-
plain the distribution of the outcome across the 
population. If individuals cannot be made account-
able for their circumstances, they should not be 
made accountable for the correlation between cir-
cumstances and effort, either. As a consequence, the 
notion of responsibility that is relevant in this setting 
should define effort as orthogonal to the circum-
stances. Assuming (as in Roemer, 1998) that there is 
a monotonic relation between effort and outcomes 
for any given circumstance, and that effort has only 
a relativistic meaning (i.e. more effort never yields 
lower outcomes), then individual effort can be iden-
tified by the position p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, that this indi-
vidual occupies in the outcome’s distribution made 
conditional on his type. We define a quantile ys(c,p) as 
the outcome level associated with position or effort 
p in the outcome’s Pen’s Parade, obtained by arrang-
ing outcomes by increasing magnitude (196).
We define therefore EOp in state s as a situation 
where ys(c,p) = ys(c',p) for any pair c ≠ c' and for any 
level of effort identified by the position p. When 
EOp holds, the opportunity profiles offered to dif-
ferent types exerting the same effort coincide. Al-
(196) To identify the outcome quantile ys(c,p), it is sufficient to 
represent the cumulative distribution (cdf) of outcome 
ys conditional on circumstances c (denoted FS(y|c), which 
indicates the share of population whose outcome is smaller 
than y) and then to measure the level of income corresponding 
to the poorest p-percent of the population. This quantile 
satisfies: p = FS (ys(c,p)|c). The Pen’s Parade is a graphical 
representation of the distribution of ys(c,p) at various levels of p. 
It is often denoted by the inverse cdf: ys(c,p) = F‑1s   (p|c) 
(see Maccheroni et al. 2005 for notation).
though opportunity profiles conditional on effort 
and circumstances are singletons (i.e. outcome lev-
els), the hypothesis above makes the EOp criterion 
distributional in nature. Figure 24.1 illustrates this 
point. The Pen’s Parades of outcomes distributions 
for types c and c' are reported in this figure. For each 
type, the curve’s height in a given point (measured 
on the vertical axis) corresponds to the income as-
sociated with that level of effort (measured on the 
horizontal axis). Only the first panel displays a case 
where EOp is satisfied. In fact, the two types’ out-
come Pen’s Parades coincide at every effort level. In 
the remaining cases, a form of inequality of oppor‑
tunity prevails.
In the central panel of the figure, type c enjoys an 
advantage compared to type c’ that holds irrespec-
tive of the effort chosen. In the right hand-side 
panel, type c’ advantage is confined to compari-
sons involving low effort, while it reverses to a dis-
advantage at high effort. One intuitive, distribu-
tional measure of advantage is the gap between 
the opportunity profiles offered to each type at any 
given effort level. This is easily identifiable by the 
gap between outcomes Pen’s Parades associated 
with two types c and c', denoted: ys(c,p) – ys(c’,p), 
0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
The distribution of this gap is informative on the 
distribution and sign of advantage across pairs of 
types (for alternative models based on the same 
principle, see Lefranc et al. 2008 and Andreoli et 
al. 2014). We provide integrated assessments of the 
extent of inequality of opportunity using inequal‑
ity of opportunity indicators, denoted IOp, that are 
obtained as averages of these gaps. An IOp(s)  in-
dicator is a mathematical function that transforms 
the extent of advantage and disadvantage across 
types and effort levels into a number, which corre-
sponds to the level of inequality of opportunity in 
state s. When, IOp(s') ≥ IOp(s) state s is closer to an 
ideal situation where EOp is satisfied compared to 
state s’. If EOp holds in state s, then IOp(s) = 0.
There are many, equally valuable, alternative for-
mulations of the IOp indicator. Here, we focus on 
IOp indicators that can be expressed as the aver-
age degree of advantage in a given society. Their 
representation, involving pairwise comparisons of 
opportunity profiles, is inspired by the well-known 
Gini index formulation of income inequality. The 
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Gini index GI(.) is, in fact, a weighted average of 
the gap between any pair of incomes yi and yj ob-
served in a distribution:
∑ • • –GI(y1, …, yn): = i
i
∑
j
w i
y
| y jy  |jw
1
2µ
where wi is unit i’s weight and µy denotes the av-
erage income. There are two ways of aggregating 
evaluations across the effort dimension: the ex post 
and the ex ante perspectives.
24.2.1 Ex post perspective
In the ex post setting, we assume that the obser-
vation of effort bears relevant information for 
evaluating inequality of opportunity. Given two 
circumstances ci and cj, the absolute gap between 
opportunity profiles is a natural metric for assess-
ing the advantage of one type over the other. The 
Gini-type ex post inequality of opportunity index 
IOpp is an average, taken across the continuous ef-
fort measure considered, of the average degree of 
unfair advantage across types at each effort level 
(as measured by a Gini inequality index):
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where wci denotes the demographic size of the 
type ci and µs the average outcome in state s. In 
the ex post setting, evaluations of unfair advantage 
should be neutral with respect to inequalities relat-
ed to effort. This explains why the overall absolute 
advantage measured by IOpp(s) is then averaged 
across the effort distribution (as indicated by the 
integral operator in the formulas).
The value of the index, scaled up by 100, can be 
interpreted as the average percentage change in 
the average outcome level in state s (i.e. µs) that can 
be associated with a change in the circumstances 
of origin from cj to ci.
24.2.2 Ex ante perspective
In the ex ante setting, evaluations are made as if 
effort has not been yet exerted. This is a norma-
tive standpoint rather than an empirical necessity. 
This means that the inequality of opportunity as-
sessment should be based on overall evaluations 
of the opportunities distributions of each type at 
any effort levels, denoted Fs(y|c). Each distribution 
represents the complete mapping between out-
comes and responsibility. Evaluations are carried 
over through evaluation functions, denoted E, of 
the conditional distributions Fs(y|c). Evaluations 
might incorporate efficiency (i.e. only the average 
size of the advantage experienced by the type 
should matter) and even equity (i.e. also the uncer-
Figure 24.1: Equality and inequality of opportunity
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Reading note: Effort (p) is measured on the horizontal axis, quantiles of outcomes (y) on the vertical axis. The yellow (blue) line refers to the 
distribution of outcomes of type c (c’).
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tainty in the effort distribution should be taken into 
account) concerns about the effort distribution, 
which is ex ante unknown. The overall disadvan-
tage in a society is captured by the ex ante index 
IOpA. It consists in an assessment of the dispersion 
in evaluations across types. If the dispersion is 
measured by the Gini index, we obtain:
IOp
A
(s): = GI (E(F
s
(y|c
1
)), …, E(F
s
(y|c
N
)))
We consider two specifications of this index. In the 
first case, evaluation is exclusively based on an ef-
ficiency argument, implying that the focus should 
be on the average realisations of individuals with 
circumstance c, denoted μc, so that E(FS(y|c)) = μc. 
The corresponding ex ante inequality of opportuni-
ty index is denoted:
∑ • • –
IOp
A1
(s): = 
= 
ic c
i
∑
j
w
GI (µ
c     
, …, µ
c
   )
s
s
| ∫ dp|.(ci ,p) sy  (cj ,p)jw y
1
2µ
1 N
1
0
By definition, the integral in the second row is 
equivalent to µci – µcj , since the area below a Pen’s 
Parades (i.e., its integral) is an alternative way of 
computing the average of the outcomes generat-
ing that Parade. In this type of evaluation, positive 
and negative gaps in opportunities along the ef-
fort domain can exactly compensate each other.
In the second case, we consider evaluations incor-
porating efficiency and equity concerns, incorpo-
rating not only the expected realisations of a type’s 
opportunities distribution, but also the intrinsic un-
certainty about the distribution of effort. To do so, 
we express the evaluation as the expected value of 
an opportunity profile corrected by an inequality 
measure, which captures distributional concerns. 
Assuming that the inequality in each type’s oppor-
tunities distribution is measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient GIc , the new ex ante inequality of opportunity 
indicator writes:
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The Gini index GIc can be reformulated as the in-
tegral of a Pen’s Parade, distorted by a weighting 
function, 2 · (1 – p), that depends on the position 
along the parade (for references see Zoli, 1999). In 
this type of evaluations, positive gaps in opportu-
nities associated with low effort levels overweight 
negative gaps of equal intensity, but associated 
with high effort level. This is the perspective behind 
the Gini Opportunity index by Lefranc et al. (2009).
24.2.3 Comparing the two 
approaches
The indicators provide different perspectives about 
the distribution of advantage that are interesting 
in their own right. The comparison of these indi-
cators is, indeed, useful to assess which dimension 
of advantage is driving countries’ performance. 
The indicators have a common interpretation: they 
measure the expected percentage change in op-
portunities (income) associated with a change in the 
circumstances. Since circumstances are not a-priori 
ordered, assessments of this differential effect re-
quire a comparison of gaps across all possible pairs 
involved in the analysis. These gaps are estimated 
in a regression framework (197). Finally, note that the 
well-known clash between the ex ante and ex post 
perspectives (Fleurbaey, 2008) emerges clearly from 
the formulation of the indicators IOpP and IOpA. They 
essentially differ from where the absolute value, de-
fining the extent of advantage, is placed. Unless the 
types can be clearly ordered by the advantage they 
confer, thereby giving IOpP = IOpA1, the indicators IOpP 
and IOpA1 give different perspectives on the extent 
of inequality of opportunity. The IOpA2 index, instead, 
conveys additional information on the distributional 
features of the ex ante distributions of opportunities.
(197) To estimate the IOp(s) indices we use quantile regression 
within a RIF design to estimate gaps at selected deciles of 
the conditional distributions, and then we average these 
gaps according to the relative size of the type in the sample. 
Standard errors of our estimates are bootstrapped (see 
Goedemé, 2013 for bootstrap analysis on EU-SILC data).
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24.3 Using EU‑SILC 
intergenerational modules 
to study inequality of 
opportunity
We use our measurement framework to investigate 
the evolution of inequality of opportunity across 
selected EU countries. In addition to the core infor-
mation collected in EU-SILC (see Chapter 2 in this 
book), every year ad hoc modules on specific topics 
are added to the cross-sectional dataset. We use the 
2005 module on ‘Intergenerational transmission of 
poverty’ and the 2011 module on ‘Intergeneration-
al transmission of disadvantage’ to construct be-
tween-states, cross periods, comparisons of the re-
cent evolution of inequality of opportunity in the EU. 
These modules provide repeated cross-sectional in-
formation on the socioeconomic background of or-
igin of the individuals interviewed in EU-SILC, along 
with standard relevant measures of labour market 
outcomes. In particular, they contain retrospective 
information about the parental background experi-
enced by the respondents when aged between 12 
and 16 (see Atkinson et al., 1983 for pros and cons 
of retrospective data). This unique base provides 
(to a large extent) comparable data allowing similar 
definitions for variables measuring outcome and cir-
cumstances across countries and time (198).
Our estimation sample covers 19 countries where 
data of interest are available both in 2005 and 
2011 (199). Our objective is to estimate opportu-
nity profiles in each country from labour market 
outcomes. As a consequence, the focus is shifted 
on individuals, rather than households. To esti-
mate opportunity profiles, we restrict attention to 
males aged between 30 and 50 who worked full 
time as an employee for at least 7 months in the 
(198) The assessment of the implementation of each module 
can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
income-and-living-conditions/data/ad-hoc-modules; see 
Whelan et al., 2013 for possible limitations of the 2005 module.
(199) These countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), 
Denmark, (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Lithuania (LT), 
Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland 
(PL), Sweden (SE), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
The other countries were left out because they were not 
present in both years, did not report gross earnings in 2005 or 
because of other data issues.
income reference period. In addition, individuals 
who declared that they were living in another pri-
vate household, foster home, collective household 
or institution were excluded. All tables are based 
on this estimation sample. Following Raitano and 
Vona (2014), we use the intergenerational module 
weight included in both modules. In 2011, these 
weights are available for 16 countries. For Den-
mark, France and Cyprus, we substitute the missing 
intergenerational module weights in 2011 with the 
personal non-module specific weights.
24.3.1 Circumstances
The modules contain retrospective information 
about parents’ educational attainment, occupa-
tional status, labour market activity status, family 
composition as well as presence of financial diffi-
culties during respondents’ teenage years. In this 
chapter, we focus on the educational attainment of 
the father as the relevant circumstance. This choice, 
which is in line with previous literature (e.g. Roem-
er, 1998 or Lefranc et al., 2008), is driven by compa-
rability motives and by sample size requirements at 
the moment of estimating the unfair disadvantage 
distribution. As a consequence, we disregard inter-
esting circumstances that were not present in both 
waves (e.g. the migration status of the parents) or 
whose comparability over time is not guaranteed 
(e.g. financial difficulties). By using paternal edu-
cation we aim, nonetheless, at drawing out the 
effect of a circumstance which escapes individual 
responsibility but might explain unfair inequalities 
in the labour market.
To construct circumstances, individuals are first di-
vided in three types (or groups) according to their 
father’s education. The high education type con-
sists of individuals who lived in a household where 
the father attained the first (e.g. bachelor, master 
or equivalent) or second (e.g. PhD or equivalent) 
stage of tertiary education; the medium education 
type consists of individuals who lived in a house-
hold where the father attained upper secondary 
education and post-secondary, non-tertiary educa-
tion. Finally, the low education type consists of indi-
viduals who lived in a household where the father 
at most completed lower secondary education.
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24.3.2 Outcome
Our outcome variable of interest is the annual gross 
employee cash or near cash income. It is defined 
as the monetary component of the compensation 
in cash payable by an employer to an employee, 
and it includes the value of any social contributions 
and income taxes payable by an employee or by 
the employer on behalf of the employee to social 
insurance schemes or tax authorities. This variable 
reflects the relation between the labour income 
and individual circumstances before state interven-
tion. Differences in earnings originating from this 
variable are likely to reflect the effect that paternal 
education has on the individual skill accumulation 
process, on the individual costs in exerting effort, 
and on equal access to all positions offered in the 
job market.
Two caveats apply to this particular metric of op-
portunities. First, this variable is defined at the level 
of the individual, implying that labour supply de-
cisions are assumed to be made at individual lev-
el, thus neglecting household bargaining issues. 
Second, earnings represent yearly evaluations of 
performances, since we focus on individuals who 
spent more than 6 months in the income reference 
period as full-time workers. The observed earnings 
were converted in purchasing power standard 
(PPS) using the conversion rates provided on the 
CIRCABC user group (200). Table 24.1 contains the 
average gross earnings by type and country. As 
expected, individuals with a more highly-educated 
father have the highest gross earnings.
(200) See: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/3c60eeec-aca4-
4db7-a035-0a6d892e6069. It is also worth mentioning that 
the method is scale invariant, which means that we obtain 
the same results when analysing gross earnings in national 
currency or after conversion in PPS. On PPS, see also Chapters 1 
and 3 in this book.
Table 24.1: Average gross earnings by type and country, 2005 and 2011
(Purchasing Power Standard (PPS))
Country
2005 2011
All High Medium Low All High Medium Low
Belgium 38 363 66 493 35 496 32 305 38 693 45 270 38 943 35 600
Denmark 33 253 37 810 33 851 31 065 41 770 48 700 40 558 37 749
Germany 39 142 42 081 38 409 35 727 40 160 43 920 39 571 34 104
Estonia 11 268 14 356 11 882 9 153 17 672 22 060 17 390 13 935
Ireland 36 824 41 470 68 336 31 446 44 464 54 726 46 432 38 981
France 27 205 35 618 28 954 25 592 30 807 40 700 35 729 28 636
Cyprus 26 459 32 351 31 562 24 744 32 014 34 834 35 207 30 629
Lithuania 8 813 13 268 9 100 7 746 10 630 12 844 12 185 9 077
Luxembourg 51 020 70 120 59 723 43 286 47 993 67 426 56 391 37 817
Hungary 9 945 22 108 10 427 6 922 12 715 18 918 13 918 10 857
Netherlands 40 361 48 555 44 080 37 092 47 214 51 018 49 156 43 257
Austria 32 394 39 010 35 534 29 768 39 727 48 731 40 634 34 993
Poland 11 735 16 894 12 491 10 185 16 975 24 766 17 291 14 558
Slovakia 7 371 11 391 7 277 6 408 14 374 18 364 14 042 13 512
Finland 26 592 35 366 25 168 24 385 36 364 41 078 34 242 35 158
Sweden 27 415 36 523 28 252 25 554 34 342 42 470 33 386 31 255
United Kingdom 44 324 58 673 50 498 37 726 41 626 55 472 39 974 37 751
Iceland 36 024 42 207 37 558 31 706 36 011 39 874 37 146 32 290
Norway 34 155 39 756 33 207 31 290 46 681 52 887 45 093 42 374
Reading note: In Austria in 2005, the average gross earnings of our estimation sample was 32 394 Purchasing Power Standard (PPS; see Chapters 
1 and 3 in this book). For individuals who lived in a household whose father was highly (low) educated when he was between 12 and 16 it was 
39 010 (29 768) PPS.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
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24.4 Results
In this section, we first study the patterns of the indi-
cators discussed in Section 24.2 and applied to the 
EU-SILC data presented in Section 24.3. Then, we ex-
plain how these indices relate to known measures 
of intergenerational income elasticity. This perspec-
tive makes clear that the inequality of opportunity 
indicators capture components related to structur-
al inequalities and disadvantage. Finally, we discuss 
how the structural component of disadvantage is 
related to the ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion’ 
(AROPE) EU indicator.
24.4.1 Inequality of opportunity 
indices
As the data show, the social prestige stemming from 
the paternal educational status also reflects the unfair 
advantage or disadvantage that these circumstances 
are likely to generate in terms of opportunity profiles 
for the younger generations. This holds across all 
years and countries. The magnitude of these gaps, 
along with their variation across time, are reported in 
Figure 24.2. The figure also reports, for each estimate, 
the 95 % confidence interval based on bootstrapped 
resampling procedures on baseline data, where strat-
ification by country, year and region of residence is 
accounted for (see Goedemé, 2013).
The top-left panel of the figure shows that there is 
a strong heterogeneity in inequality of opportunity 
(measured in the ex post perspective) across the 19 
EU countries considered in this chapter. In 2005, we 
can distinguish two well-defined groups of coun-
tries. The first group, comprising the Nordic coun-
tries, as well as Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
Cyprus and the Netherlands, displays low levels of 
inequality of opportunity, ranging from 0.023 to 
0.04. The remaining countries display higher het-
erogeneity in inequality of opportunity, ranging 
from 0.043 for Slovakia to 0.098 for Hungary. This 
group includes lower income EU countries, with 
some notable exceptions such as Finland, Luxem-
bourg and the United Kingdom. For the last two 
countries, it is likely that part of the measured in-
equality of opportunity is driven by the high-skill 
premium specific to their labour market conditions, 
which has probably benefitted more those coming 
from relatively advantaged backgrounds. In gener-
al, we conclude that these indicators are all signifi-
cantly positive in the statistical sense.
We can give an easy interpretation to the extent 
of inequality of opportunity measured by the in-
dicators: in Germany (the least ‘opportunity une-
qual’ country in 2005), one expects that a shift in 
the background circumstances generates a 2.3 % 
change in earnings, while the same shift would in-
duce a 9.8 % change in earnings in Hungary (the 
most opportunity unequal country in 2005).
Some patterns of changes in ex post inequality of 
opportunity across the 2005-2011 period are worth 
mentioning. Among the least opportunity unequal 
countries in 2005 we generally observe an increase 
in inequality of opportunity, with the largest change 
in absolute terms being registered in Austria. Coun-
tries placed at the centre of the inequality of op-
portunity spectrum in 2005 generally experienced 
a drop in IOpp index. These reductions have been 
particularly high for the Netherlands and Cyprus, be-
coming the least opportunity unequal countries in 
2011. For the most opportunity unequal countries in 
2005, the change is more heterogeneously distribut-
ed. Finland, for instance, has seen a major drop while 
Luxembourg has jumped to the top of the ranking 
in 2011, with a measured inequality of opportunity 
of around 0.11, which can be interpreted as 11 % of 
the average income. How many of these changes 
are statistically significant? An answer comes from 
the analysis of the patterns of IOpp differences and 
their standard errors across the countries, reported in 
the bottom-right panel of Figure 24.2. As the graph 
shows, the 95 % confidence interval around the ab-
solute change in inequality of opportunity contains 
the zero for most of the countries, detecting cases 
where the changes between the 2 years are not 
statistically significant. Relevant exceptions to the 
general trend are Austria, where inequality of oppor-
tunity has increased by 0.018, and Finland, where ine-
quality of opportunity has dropped by 0.024 in 2011. 
Overall, we conclude that the level of ex post inequal-
ity of opportunity has not dramatically changed dur-
ing the period considered, underlying the relevance 
of long term trends in this phenomenon.
Moving onto the analysis of the ex ante inequality 
opportunity perspective embodied by the IOpA1 
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indicator, we obtain patterns that are very closely re-
lated to what has been discussed above. The results 
reported in the top-right panel of the figure reflect 
the patterns described above, indicating that the 
opportunities prospects associated with the groups 
we are looking at can be ordered consistently at 
any effort level. These results confirm that the ex-
tent of inequality of opportunity we are measuring 
is characterised by a strong component of advan-
tage across types, with children of more educated 
parents expecting more favourable opportunities, 
which is unchanged across the effort spectrum.
Also the bottom-left panel of the figure, reporting 
the distribution of IOpA2 indicators across countries, 
displays a pattern in line with the evolution of ine-
quality of opportunity in the ex post setting. Howev-
er, the size of inequality of opportunity is somehow 
lower. This finding reflects the fact that the IOpA2 
indicator gives larger weight to the advantage/
disadvantage concentrated at the bottom of the 
distribution of effort. Hence, the overall advantage/
disadvantage between the different types must be 
concentrated at high levels of effort, indicating that 
children from families with more educated fathers 
receive an economic advantage in the labour mar-
ket compared to children from low educated fa-
thers, and this advantage increases along the ‘com-
parable’ effort dimension. Comparing the patterns 
in 2005 and 2011, we find that changes in the IOpA2 
index reflect changes observed for the other indica-
tors. The relevant exception is Luxembourg, where 
we cannot reject that ex ante inequality of opportu-
nity has augmented in the period considered.
What are the drivers of these results? The answer 
lies on the cross-country heterogeneity in the pat-
tern of the gaps between opportunity profiles as-
sociated with different types. These gaps are con-
veniently rearranged and reported with their 95 % 
confidence intervals in Figure 24.3. In the figure, the 
height of the bars represents the weighted average 
gap in PPS between pairs of types, where the op-
portunity profile of children with more educated 
parents is always compared with the opportuni-
ty profile of children with less educated parents. 
These gaps are mostly positive, aside from some 
cases where they are not statistically distinguish-
able from zero. In general, the gaps between the 
children from more educated parents and those 
from less educated parents drive the inequality 
of opportunity indices, despite the relatively small 
size of the most advantaged type across the sam-
ple of countries considered here.
Notable cases where the gap is particularly high 
are Luxembourg, registering the largest gap across 
types, and Ireland (201).
24.4.2 Inequality of opportunity 
and risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The inequality of opportunity indicators are related 
to structural components of inequality that have to 
do with the pattern of transmission of advantage 
and disadvantage across generations. We support 
this conjecture by drawing from the literature on 
intergenerational father-son earnings elasticity. Re-
liable estimates for these elasticities, depicting the 
percentage change in the earnings of the son as 
a response to a 1 % change in paternal earnings, are 
practically hard to identify and measure on availa-
ble data. The most reliable estimates are available 
for Nordic countries (see Jäntti and Jenkins, 2014).
For illustrational purposes, we focus on the case 
of Sweden in 2005. In the data, we find that 
IOpp = 0.038, indicating that over the effort distri-
bution, an increase by a category of the paternal 
educational standards when the child was still 
living with the parents is associated with a 3.8 % 
increase in the expected advantage this child will 
experience. Here, the ‘change’ in circumstances 
has a vague interpretation, since circumstances 
are not ordered on a-priori ground (they represent 
categories of parental education). However, with 
the appropriate metric the indicator can be asso-
ciated with a measure of intergenerational elas-
ticity. Let us approximate the expected shift of an 
educational circumstance by the income returns 
to education that fathers would have experienced 
over the life cycle. For Sweden, it can be safely ar-
gued that returns from education for the father’s 
(201) It is worth recalling that the indicators are standardised by 
the mean income of the country. Hence, despite the fact 
that Luxembourg displays larger advantage gaps in 2005 
compared to Hungary, it also has a comparatively larger 
average expected earnings levels which finally smooths the 
evaluation of these gaps.
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Figure 24.2: Inequality of opportunity indicators and their changes, 2005 and 2011
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NB: The two panels at the top and the bottom-left panel report the patterns of the ex post and ex ante indicators in 2005 and 2011 for all selected 
countries. In these three panels, the vertical columns indicate the level of inequality of opportunity in a given country-year as measured by one 
of the indicators. The bottom-right panel reports, for each country, the actual changes in the indicators from 2005 to 2011. In all four panels, the 
grey bars indicate the 95 % confidence bands for these estimates (based on 250 bootstraps replications for stratified data). Countries are ordered 
by IOpp values in 2005.
Reading note (top-left panel): In Germany (least ‘opportunity unequal’ country in 2005), the 0.023 figure means that a shift in the background 
circumstances is expected to generate a 2.3 % change in wages.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
generation considered here are generally larger 
than 9.95 % (202). Using these data, we can infer an 
(202) Björklund (1986) has documented a fall in the returns to 
schooling in Sweden from 7.8 % in 1968 to nearly 4 % in 1984. 
This result is confirmed by Björklund and Kjellström (2002) who 
show that for male worker, the returns from education estimated 
by the Mincer equation have shifted in the same time span from 
8.7 % to 4.6 %, or from 11.2 % to 5.4 % according to the reference 
scenario. It is therefore reasonable to assume a 9.95 % return 
to education for the cohort of the parents considered in this 
study. Given the trend identified by the two authors, and the 
possibly large shift in human capital associated with a change in 
the circumstances we consider, this figure is likely to be a lower 
bound of the earning variation we are interested in.
upper bound for the earning elasticity between fa-
thers and children earnings of nearly 0.382 (equal 
to 3.8 %/9.95 %), which is close to the 0.3 intergen-
erational elasticity estimate found by Björklund 
and Jäntti (1997) on 1990 earnings of Swedish male 
workers aged 29-38.
This simple example shows the relevance of the in-
equality of opportunity analysis in capturing inter-
generational patterns of advantage and disadvan-
tage, and allows approximate mobility coefficients 
for countries where reliable estimates of intergen-
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Figure 24.3: Average weighted gaps in opportunity profiles across types, 2005 and 2011
(in Purchasing Power Standards)
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Reading note: Each panel reports, for each country in a given year, the weighted average gap between the opportunity profiles of pairs of 
types (high, low and medium educated fathers), or a total of three comparisons per country. The grey bars indicate the 95 % confidence bands 
for these estimates (based on 250 bootstraps replications for stratified data). Values trimmed at 24 000 and -4 000 PPS. Countries ranked as in 
Figure 24.2.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014.
erational elasticities are not available. Within this 
perspective, it is interesting to understand how the 
intergenerational dimension of disadvantage is re-
lated to the actual extent of disadvantage. Figure 
24.4 provides some hints on this. The figure scatters 
the 19 countries considered in this study, where the 
level of ex post inequality of opportunity measured 
in 2011 is confronted with the realisations of the EU 
indicator of ‘at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion 
(AROPE) for the male population aged 25-49. The 
figure provides evidence on two stylised facts. 
First, that there is a positive association between 
short-term disadvantage, as captured by the AROPE 
index, and long-term disadvantage, as captured 
by IOpp Hence, countries promoting labour market 
policies targeting the AROPE indicator have good 
chances of reducing the process of intergeneration-
al persistence of disadvantage. The second fact is 
that, even among countries with very low levels and 
stable patterns of actual disadvantage, there is high 
heterogeneity in intergenerational disadvantage. 
This indicates that despite similar level of poverty or 
social exclusion, the policies targeting intergenera-
tional disadvantage may affect the channels through 
which disadvantage passes across generations. This 
can be done, for instance by fostering participation 
in the educational system or, as suggested by recent 
evidence in Andreoli et al. (2014), by shaping univer-
sal pre-schooling programmes to provide uniform 
high quality pre-primary education to all children, 
while targeting with additional support those chil-
dren with the most disadvantaged background 
who are most unlikely to thrive in the labour market. 
This form of predistribution taking place early in life 
would contribute to promoting a fair distribution 
of resources later on, alongside yielding efficiency 
gains if the disadvantaged children are those with 
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larger potential to develop additional skills that are 
valuable in the labour market (203).
24.5 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, to 
propose a novel way of quantifying the degree of 
inequality of opportunity through simple indicators, 
which are consistent with the normative perspec-
tives on EOp. Secondly, to illustrate this measurement 
framework by investigating the evolution of inequal-
ity of opportunity across a selection of European 
(203) A synthetic overview of mechanism transforming 
predistribution of skills into redistribution of wealth 
can be found in J.J. Heckman’s post on the Boston 
Review: http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/
promoting-social-mobility-james-heckman (Accessed: 10 
March 2016).
countries between 2005 and 2011. Our analysis sug-
gests that there have been no statistically significant 
changes in inequality of opportunity across the 19 EU 
countries considered in the study. There are excep-
tions, and the change seems to be driven from varia-
tions in the gap between opportunity profiles of the 
more and the least advantage ‘types’ (a type gathers 
all individuals who share similar characteristics for 
which they cannot be held responsible for, such as 
paternal education). While these results probably re-
flect the differentiated effect of the recent crisis on 
each country’s labour market (our analysis focuses 
on gross earnings, i.e. before taxes and transfers) and 
the measures that have been proposed to mitigate 
its effects though incentives to the labour market, 
explaining the causes of this evolution will require 
further research and analysis (e.g. focusing on house-
hold net income).
Figure 24.4: Disadvantage in opportunities and the risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2011
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Reading note: The AROPE index is based on male population aged 25-49 in 2011. The OLS estimates of the fitted regression line coefficients (SE) 
are 0.011 (0.015) for the intercept and 0.207 (0.078) for the slope.
Source: Authors’ computation, UDBs of August 2009 and August 2014. The AROPE indicator for selected countries is available from the 
Eurostat web-database (code ilc_peps01). Data extracted on 24.9.2014.
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While the EU-SILC 2005 and 2011 modules constitute 
the best available data to answer our research ques-
tion, some comparability issues across countries and 
time constrained us to reduce the scope of our analy-
sis to countries which collected both waves and with 
similar income and circumstances (father’s education) 
data. Indeed, the 2011 module is an improved version 
of the 2005 module taking into account pitfalls of the 
initial module highlighted by the assessment of the 
2005 module (see also Whelan et al., 2013 for issues 
related to the 2005 module). These improvements 
increase the quality of the 2011 data but affect the 
comparisons of the results drawn from both mod-
ules. For example, the possibility for respondents to 
answer ‘don’t know’ to a wide range of questions in 
2011 (an option that was not given to the respondent 
in the 2005 questionnaire) may affect the compari-
sons of the results drawn from the two modules in 
ways that are difficult to assess.
In addition, as already mentioned, the two EU-SILC 
modules are examples of retrospective questions 
that ask ‘present-day respondents about past history’ 
(Atkinson et al., 1983, p. 17). Respondents are asked 
about their parents’ past characteristics. This type of 
survey is appealing as it allows the study of intergen-
erational issues without actually having to wait for 
two generations. The validity of the data is, however, 
crucial and rests on the ability of each respondent to 
provide accurate answers about their parents’ char-
acteristics. To our knowledge, no external validity 
test of the retrospective modules present in EU-SILC 
has been undertaken. In order to do so, confronting 
EU-SILC module data with official records in register 
countries, or encouraging the researchers commu-
nity to engage in meta-analysis, such as the one we 
performed by comparing inequality of opportunity 
indicators with results from the literature on intergen-
erational earnings elasticity, may be a strategy worth 
exploring further.
Finally, while our results depend on elements such as 
the choice of the outcome variable and the circum-
stances or, as already mentioned, the validity of the 
retrospective modules, they provide a new perspec-
tive on the distribution of well-being which can use-
fully complement the Europe 2020 social inclusion 
target. Indeed, the inequality of opportunity indica-
tors are positively associated with actual measures of 
disadvantage and social exclusion, such as the AROPE 
indicator. However, this correlation is not perfect and 
the inequality of opportunity indicators seem to cap-
ture some underlying heterogeneity among coun-
tries with very low and similar levels of social exclu-
sion. This perspective highlights that the inequality of 
opportunity analysis is relevant in its own right, and 
that introducing inequality of opportunity indicators 
in the toolkit of the European social policymaker will 
foster the knowledge of the patterns of intergenera-
tional persistence of inequality across the EU.
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